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‘What gets measured gets done’: exploring the social 
construction of globalized knowledge for development 
 
Ruth Buchanan, Kimberley Byers and Kristina Mansveld 
 
 
Abstract: The project of international development can be 
understood as a way of seeing the world that is both constituted by 
and interwoven with evolving processes of measurement, 
comparison and quantification. Drawing on the sociological insight 
that regimes of measurement can never be ‘neutral’ representations 
of external ‘objects’, but are instead actively engaged in shaping 
what can be known, this chapter critically examines the ways in 
which the production of globalized rankings and metrics are 
imbricated with the production of the social and economic 
hierarchies that development as a project seeks to ameliorate. The 
chapter illustrates the mechanisms and effects of this co-production 
of the development project and its practices of quantification, 
through a close consideration of the case of Millennium 
Development Goal 7 Target D. 
 
‘What we know about the world is intimately linked to our sense 
of what can we can do about it, as well as to the felt legitimacy 
of specific actors, instruments and courses of action.’1 
 
‘What gets measured gets done.' - MDG Final Report, 2015 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
The project of international development can be understood as a 
way of seeing the world that is both constituted by and interwoven 
with evolving processes of measurement, comparison and 
quantification. What development is understood to be and how it is 
measured are mutually constitutive processes. Development 
emerges as a way of locating ‘underdeveloped’ states in relation to 
the rich world after the Second World War.2 Since the postwar era, 
the definition and objectives of development have evolved in 
tandem with available data sets. 3 Drawing on the sociological 
                                                        
1 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society’ in Sheila Jasanoff 
(ed), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order 
(Routledge 2004) 14. 
2  Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic 
Growth and the Politics of Universality (CUP 2011). 
3  E Wayne Nafziger, 'From Seers to Sen: The Meaning of Economic 
Development' in George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks (eds), Advancing 
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insight that regimes of measurement can never be ‘neutral’ 
representations of external ‘objects’, but are instead actively 
engaged in shaping what can be known, this chapter approaches 
the various rankings and metrics created by development 
institutions as practices that are both integral to and constitutive of 
the project of development. 
The proliferation of international development indices over 
the past several decades has made knowledge production for 
development an important arena of inquiry for socio-legal scholars 
interested in international institutions and governance. 4 A 
considerable amount of research has been conducted on the 
mechanisms by which credibility and influence over development 
policy are acquired through the production and dissemination of 
quantified and commensurable data sets.5 We know, for example, 
that the reliance upon quantitative and measurable targets are 
favoured by international institutions such as the World Bank, 
possessing the financial and professional resources to create and 
monitor the necessary knowledge collection infrastructures.6 The 
imperative to produce tangible measures of development outcomes 
is usually rationalized in terms of benefits, such as the ability to 
focus on particular issues, increased accountability, and improved 
policies. And yet it is also well established that these practices of 
quantification are ‘bound up in entanglements of power’ and can 
work to inscribe hierarchies.7 Research has documented the variety 
of productive effects, both intended and unintended, that are bound 
up with indicators’ growing significance as a technology of 
governance, including their key role in shaping ‘what can be 
known at any given time, as well as how that knowledge can be 
                                                                                                                            
Development (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 50. See also Dudley Seers, 'The 
Meaning of Development' (1969) IDS Communication 44, Institute of 
Development Studies.   
4  Kevin E Davis et al., Governance by Indicators: Global Power through 
Classification and Rankings (OUP 2012); Kevin E Davis and Benedict 
Kingsbury, ‘Indicators as Interventions: Pitfalls and Prospects in Supporting 
Development Initiatives’ (Report, Rockefeller Foundation 2011); Doris Buss, 
‘Measurement Imperatives and Gender Politics: An Introduction’ (2015) 22(3) 
Social Politics 381 <http://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxv030>. 
5  Richard Rottenburg et al. (eds), The World of Indicators: The Making of 
Governmental Knowledge through Quantification (CUP 2015). 
6 David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape 
Global Political Economy (1st edn, Princeton University Press 2016). 
7 Buss (n 4); Tor Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the 
Reproduction of Neoliberal Common Sense’ (2013) 34(1) Third World Q 131; 
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, 'Prepare Your Indicators: Economics Imperialism on 
the Shores of Law and Development' (2011) 7(4) Int J Law Context 401 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S174455231100022X>. 
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used.’ 8 Yamin and Fukuda Parr have noted, in relation to the 
Millennium Development Goals, that they had the capacity to 
‘redefine the framework for understanding the purpose of 
development, the key constraints and the means to address them.’9  
Development indices determine which information counts, and 
which doesn’t, for the purpose of identifying desirable 
development outcomes and orienting future development policy.  
As measures of development have proliferated, so have 
debates over the appropriateness or suitability of competing 
measurement regimes. Tracking development outcomes is a 
complex social process that involves a series of evaluative 
decisions, including what is to be the target of measurement, which 
indicators will be chosen to stand as proxies for the target, and 
which institutions or practices will be utilized for measuring, 
compiling, and tracking. These decisions all matter a great deal to 
the intended beneficiaries of development policies - poor states and 
their citizens - and yet their role in these processes of knowledge 
production is, for the most part, passive and limited. The ‘power of 
numbers’ used in this way lies in the process by which these 
difficult and contestable choices become submerged, or ‘black-
boxed’ in the ensuing indicator, such that the resulting ‘data’ 
appear straightforward and ‘factual’. 10 Moreover, that some 
‘objects’ (income poverty, maternal mortality) seem inherently 
‘measurable’ while others (community empowerment, tenure 
security) seem to resist measurement is itself an effect of an 
already existing ‘information infrastructure that has ‘pre-
formatted’ categories, data, and concepts in order to render them 
countable.’ 11 While some commentators have identified in the 
emergence of various ‘alternative’ indices the potential for 
contestation, it is also clear that the most powerful and effective 
indicators are those that globally commensurate—that is, they 
function to dis-embed data from local contexts, facilitating cross-
national comparisons. To the extent that alternative indices seek to 
re-embed salient local factors, or to revalorize overlooked 
concerns, they encounter what Merry and Wood have described as 
the ‘paradox of measurement’; that is, ‘indicators reveal 
                                                        
8 Buss, ibid. 3. See also Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems 
of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (1st  edn, University Of 
Chicago Press 1998) 7. 
9 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Alicia Ely Yamin, 'The Power of Numbers: A Critical 
Review of MDG Targets and Indicators' (2013) 56(1) Development 58, 59. 
10 Tony Porter, 'Making Serious Measures: Numerical Indices, Peer Review, and 
Transnational Actor-Networks' (2012) 15(4) J INT RELAT DEV 532 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1057/jird.2011.15>. 
11  Nehal Bhuta comment on Sally Engle Merry and Summer Wood, 
‘Quantification and the Paradox of Measurement: Translating Children’s Rights 
in Tanzania’ (2015) 56(2) Curr Anthropol 205, 219.  
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information about issues that are already being measured well, but 
they do not shed light on important problems that are not being 
measured.’12 
If development indicators are understood in this way – as 
part of a thickening swarm of technologies of quantified 
knowledge production and data circulating on a global scale –they 
present a different sort of challenge to the researcher. In the place 
of familiar debates over the adequacy and accuracy of data and the 
selection of appropriate indicators, a different and more salient 
question emerges: whether and in what ways development 
indicators function to constitute and maintain the global 
inequalities that the development project is charged with 
dismantling. 13 This chapter seeks both to encapsulate this 
methodological reorientation with reference to the burgeoning 
literature on indicators and development, as well as to provide one 
cogent illustration of the process of co-evolution in the definition 
and measurement of development outcomes through a brief 
account of MDG 7D. 
As we detail below, the ‘slum’ - as a way of both seeing 
and measuring urban poverty - was explicitly drawn into 
international development discourse through a Cities Alliance 
Report entitled ‘Cities without Slums’, from which the Millennium 
Declaration drew its modest objective. This objective was 
subsequently incorporated into Millennium Development Goal #7, 
on sustainable development, which included as one of its targets; 
‘to bring about, by 2020 significant improvements in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum-dwellers’. Through the high level 
endorsement of the MDG’s by international institutions, this target, 
also known as the Cities without Slums target, quickly became a 
highly influential mechanism for the production of knowledge for 
urban development, notwithstanding numerous challenges 
associated with its definition and tracking. The successful 
achievement of this modest target was announced well before the 
conclusion of the MDG project in 2015.  However, the MDG Final 
Report also noted that between 2000 and 2015, the absolute 
number of slum-dwellers globally had increased by 88 million to 
an estimated total of 880 million between 2000 and 2015. During 
the same timeframe, a series of UN Habitat Reports documented 
the ongoing problem of wide-scale summary evictions of urban 
slum-dwellers. These data suggest that the ‘success’ of the target in 
achieving its overall objective of ‘improving the lives of slum-
dwellers’ is at the very least debatable, and that a closer 
examination of the relationship between goals and metrics is called 
                                                        
12 Ibid. 212.  
13 See generally Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (ch 2, Harvard 
University Press 2000).  
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for. In this chapter, we are most interested in what new forms of 
knowledge are being produced and put into circulation by the 
international community’s decision to ‘target slums’.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section situates 
the development project, locating its origins in a historical moment 
that gave rise both to a new type of knowledge about national 
economies and a way of distinguishing between those economies 
that are ‘underdeveloped’ and those that are developed. In the 
second section, we provide a snapshot of the scholarship on expert 
knowledge as a world-making practice and, in particular, the 
extensive literature on measurement, quantification, and indicators 
that has emerged in the past two decades. From these broad 
debates, we draw out insights specifically relating to the sociology 
of knowledge construction for development, in order to begin to 
frame a critical sociological approach to development indicators. 
Finally, we illustrate how one might approach a specific 
development indicator in this way through a brief description of 
the formulation and implementation of Millennium Development 
Goal 7.D (the Cities without Slums target).   
 
B.   What is development? 
 
'Development ... is a specific way of knowing the world, which is both 
discourse and institutional machinery.’14   
 
 Although it claims to offer pathways to the realization of universal 
human aspirations for wellbeing, flourishing, or human freedom, 
‘development’ is understood here as a particular (western) project 
that incorporates both a way of seeing the world as well as a 
process of initiation or enculturation into that way of seeing. This 
two-part definition is echoed by Gilbert Rist, for whom 
development can be understood as ‘a belief and a series of 
practices which form a single whole in spite of contradictions 
between them.’15 The world-making effects of development take 
shape, largely, through the work of international institutions and 
the ‘development’ projects that they support. It is through the 
practices, reports, and statistics generated by these multilateral 
institutions and agencies, so frequently located in the west and 
                                                        
14  Sundhya Pahjua, ‘Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions’ in Ruth 
Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, 
Development and Transitional Justice (Hart Publishing, 2014) 35. 'Development 
has a very particular history, which is both a legacy of imperialism and 
intimately intertwined with the history of contemporary international law. It is 
not just a word; it is a specific way of knowing the world, which is both 
discourse and institutional machinery.' 
15 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global 
Faith (Zed Books, 2002) 24. 
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headed up by westerners, that the particular ideals and aspirations 
of the west are projected onto the rest of the world in the guise of 
development as a universal good. This chapter approaches this 
relation as an always in-process co-production, such that at any 
given time, it is not possible to ask the question ‘what is 
development’ without at the same time asking ‘how is it 
measured’?    
In orienting an account of the development project as a 
specific way of looking at the rest (of the world) by the west, there 
are multiple available starting-points, including many that mine the 
writings of early jurists to trace continuities between colonial and 
post-colonial eras.16 For our purpose in this chapter, however, of 
particular relevance is the emergence of an idea and practice of 
development in the post-war/Bretton Woods era. In this context, 
President Truman’s inaugural address of January 1949 is a helpful, 
albeit much remarked upon, keystone. Truman’s fourth point has 
been identified as one of the first instances in which the word 
‘underdevelopment’ makes its way into public discourse as a term 
used to refer collectively to parts of the globe that had not, at that 
time, industrialized. 17 What is of critical interest to us in this 
chapter, however, is the way in which, in Truman’s fourth point, 
that idea of ‘development’ is fused to a technology of 
measurement, which in our account is critical to its emergence as a 
powerful world-making assemblage.  
The technology of measurement is, of course, economic 
growth, as determined by emergent measures of Gross National 
Product. Truman’s speech took place at a pivotal moment in the 
emergence of the idea of a ‘national economy,’ dependent on new 
methods of tracking and accounting for wealth developed by the 
emerging field of economics and exemplified best by the measure 
of GNP as a proxy for the economic output of an entire nation, first 
developed in the US by economist Simon Kuznets.18  Kuznets’s 
work at the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research in the 
                                                        
16 The writings of jurists such as Franciso de Vitoria, Frederick Lugard, and 
Henry Maine have all provided grist for this mill. See also Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘The Case for a Visualized 
Economic Sociology of Legal Development’ (2014) 67(1) Curr Leg Probl 169 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1093/clp/cuu016>.   
17 Rist (n 15); Luis Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of 
International Law and Development (CUP 2015); Pahuja (n 2 60-62);  Jennifer 
Beard, The Political Economy of Desire: Law Development and the Nation 
(GlassHouse, 2005); and many others have offered up particularly useful 
analyses of Truman’s address.  
18 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil 
(Verso Books 2011) 136ff. In relation to GNP, Mitchell cites Kuznets’s warning 
that ‘a national total facilitates the ascription of independent significance to that 
vague entity called the national economy’ (137) which clearly went unheeded. 
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1930s had attracted the interest of policy-makers and led to a series 
of conferences on conceptual and methodological issues relating to 
macro-economic measures, at which the term Gross National 
Product was first introduced as a macro-measure of economic 
output. 19 During the Second World War, Kuznets effectively 
applied that data collection and statistical modelling work on 
national income growth in support of the U.S. war effort.20 In the 
postwar era, the tracking of GNP growth became the ‘dominant 
metric of economic performance across the western world’, and an 
international approach to standardized national accounting based 
very closely on Kuznets’s methodology was adopted by the UN by 
1953.21 Notwithstanding warnings by Kuznets and others about the 
limitations of the methodology, neoclassical growth theory 
emerged as the new mainstream approach to economics, and GNP 
(later GDP) became the ultimate proxy for national welfare. 22 
Timothy Mitchell underscores the ‘world-making’ aspect of these 
developments, noting the extent to which the ‘calculative 
machinery’ of economics became imbricated with the world that it 
was purporting to merely measure: 
 
These transformations created in the twentieth century a political 
and material world densely imbued with the expertise, calculative 
techniques and conceptual machinery of modern economics.  The 
so-called material world of governments, corporations, 
consumers and objects of consumption was arranged, managed, 
formatted and run with the help of economic expertise. The 
readiness with which it seemed that this world could be 
manipulated and modeled by economics reflected not simply that 
it was a naturally ‘quantitative’ world, as Schumpeter suggested.  
It reflected the imbrication of the concepts and calculations of 
economic science in the world it was studying.23 
 
In Truman’s fourth point, these two key transformations of the 
mid-twentieth-century are fused together. In his promise ‘to make 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’, Truman 
defined the development project as a project of economic growth 
(understood in terms of GNP). 24 In this way, the distinction 
between ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed’ parts of the world and 
the identification of the technical expertise for measuring progress 
with the discipline of economics were brought together. The 
                                                        
19  Lorenzo Fioramonti, Gross Domestic Problem: The Politics Behind the 
World’s Most Powerful Number (Zed Books 2013) 26-27. 
20 Ibid. 31-32. 
21 Ibid. 32. 
22 Ibid. 51. 
23 Mitchell (n 18) 139. 
24 Pahuja (n 2) 64-65. 
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outcome of this fusion is a reframing of the ‘old’ imperial 
hierarchies into a ‘modern’ hierarchy determined not by power 
relations but by economics. 25As noted above, GNP was still a 
relatively novel and limited aggregative measure of national 
economic activity in 1949; Truman’s speech arguably facilitates 
the transformation of Kuznets’s method for estimating levels of 
domestic economic activity in the US into a figure used for the 
measurement and comparison of economic activity among 
developing states, and between developing and developed states.26  
Notwithstanding the evident limitations of using a figure 
that measures only ‘marketized’ economic activity to calculate and 
compare productive activity across economies with widely varying 
degrees of ‘marketization’, and in spite of critiques by Kuznets and 
others that drew attention to its inaccuracies and inadequacies, 
GNP growth quickly transmogrified into both the ‘objective and 
yardstick of development.’27 That this alchemy so soon became 
unremarkable exposes the constitutive or ‘world-making’ nature of 
the development project that emerged in the postwar moment.  
Truman’s speech illustrates that the project of international 
‘development’ is conceived fundamentally as a project of 
measurement, comparison, and quantification. Moreover, it reveals 
the manner in which, from the outset, a perspective is embedded 
from which it appears possible to ‘see’ a national economy as a 
totality and to measure its successes and failures in aggregative 
terms.   
The apparent success of GNP as a way of ‘seeing’ an 
economy should not be equated with an absence of struggle, 
however. As David Kennedy has cogently argued, contestation 
among experts over the best ways to measure and compare 
economies, governance, growth, poverty, well-being, or human 
rights are a defining feature of our globalized social order. 28  
Debates over how to measure development have been in existence 
as long as debates over the nature of development itself. As early 
as 1969, in a foundational article ‘The Meaning of Development’, 
Dudley Seers observed that international ‘development’ as it was 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 64. As Pahuja explains: ‘the specific way in which development rejected 
race-based distinctions without challenging hierarchical organization or foreign 
domination per se was to eschew the now dubious value claims of imperialism 
and the newly discredited idea of racial superiority and to replace them with the 
'scientific' measure of GNP.’  
26  Rist puts it more directly: ‘Point Four simply imposed a new standard 
whereby the United States stood at the top: namely, the Gross Domestic 
Product’.  Rist (n 15) 76.  
27 Erik Thorbecke, ‘The Evolution of the Development Doctrine, 1950-2005’ in 
George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks (eds), Advancing Development: Core 
Themes in Global Economics  (Palgrave MacMillan 2007) 5. 
28 Kennedy (n 6). 
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conceived and took shape in the postwar era was fundamentally a 
project that operated through mechanisms of quantification that 
were largely inadequate to the task.29 Seers was an early critic of 
GDP as a measure of development; but he was not alone for long.  
Indeed, development critics proliferated, and by the early 1990s, 
the work of Amartya Sen on capabilities, along with a dramatic 
increase in available statistics, facilitated the creation of the 
Human Development Index, tied to the UNDP’s Human 
Development Reports as an alternative framework for approaching 
the work of development.30 The Human Development Reports, in 
particular, sought to track a wider range of factors considered 
relevant to the well-being of populations. The HDI generated its 
own debates, which led in turn to the creation of several additional 
indices. 31  In turn, and as we elaborate below, the Millennium 
Development Goals were added to the mix, and new controversies 
emerged over the identification of targets and indicators, how they 
would be tracked, and which measures - and hence whose issues - 
were to be given priority. At the time of writing, nearly sixty-eight 
years have elapsed since Truman’s inaugural address, and what can 
be observed of the intervening period is that while the measures of 
development have proliferated, and competition between measures 
has intensified, the fundamental connection between development 
and indicators of development has remained in place.  
 
C.  Towards a critical sociology of development indicators 
 
Measurement is never an innocent act. It is a thoroughly social 
process, from the array of individuals and communities engaged in 
the act of generating data, to the effects on the social relationships 
and institutions that are the subjects of measurement. Categories of 
people and behavior are created to enable counting, comparison 
and ranking to take place, affecting how problems are defined and 
emerge as worthy of attention.32  
 
Sidestepping the longstanding debates within development studies 
over the sufficiency or suitability of various indicators, this 
chapter, rather, is located within a different body of scholarship 
that seeks to examine the ways in which quantification, and 
concomitant processes such as the production and tracking of 
indicators, operate as mechanisms of knowledge production.33 As 
governments, firms, and intergovernmental organizations have 
                                                        
29 Seers (n 3).. 
30 Nafziger (n 3).   
31 Elizabeth A Stanton, 'The Human Development Index: A History' (2007) 127 
PERI Working Papers <http://scholarworks.umass.edu/peri_workingpapers/85>. 
32 Buss (n 4) 1. 
33 Jasanoff (n 1); Poovey (n 8). 
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continued to expand the scope and complexity of data that they 
gather and use for a variety of purposes, the study of 
quantification, measurement and indicators has become an 
increasingly significant (and crowded) field of scholarly interest. 34   
Some of this work draws inspiration from (interdisciplinary) 
science and technology studies, including the work of Jasanoff, 
Callon, and Latour. Other contributions are more disciplinarily 
rooted in the fields and methods of anthropology, sociology, or 
history.35 In keeping with the mandate of the volume, this chapter 
seeks to bring into focus what a sociological orientation to the 
study of indicators and development might contribute to these 
debates. To this end, we draw on the work of Espeland and 
Stevens, who have provided a general framework for engaging in 
the sociological analysis of the constitutive effects of social 
processes of quantification, such those carried out under the rubric 
of development. In particular, Espeland and Stevens have 
identified five distinct mechanisms through which quantification 
achieves its social effects. In this section, we will illustrate each of 
these mechanisms—‘work’, ‘reactivity’, ‘discipline’, ‘polyvalent 
authority’ and ‘aesthetics’, using examples from the burgeoning 
scholarship on development indicators.    
The first mechanism that Espeland and Stevens identify in 
their methodological framework for the social study of 
quantification is ‘work’. In their analysis, ‘work’ refers to the 
necessary infrastructure that lies behind the generation of numbers. 
It draws our attention to the processes by which the concepts and 
categories for counting must be invented, and the mechanisms for 
collecting and compiling the data that must be developed. Once 
gathered and analysed, this new information will need to be 
formatted and circulated to potential audiences, requiring 
considerable investments of time and energy by people and 
institutions, and yet, ‘we often forget how much infrastructure lies 
behind the numbers that are the end product of counting 
regimes.’ 36  Indeed, it is a frequently remarked upon feature of 
successful measurement formats that the considerable amount of 
work ‘behind’ the numbers becomes invisible. What is seen as 
‘natural’ and even ‘value neutral’ are the products of that work—
                                                        
34 Recent contributions to this field are diverse and they are numerous.  Notable 
among them are: Fukuda-Parr and Yamin (n 9); Kevin E Davis et al., 
'Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators' in Governance by Indicators: 
Global Power through Classification and Rankings, Kevin Davis et al. (eds), 
(OUP 2012); Merry and Wood (n 11); Krever (n 7). 
35 Sally Engle Merry and Susan Bibler Coutin, 'Technologies of Truth in the 
Anthropology of Conflict: AES/APLA Presidential Address, 2013' (2014) 41(1) 
Am Ethnol  1 <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/amet.12055>. 
36  Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L Stevens, ‘A Sociology of 
Quantification’ (2008) 49(3) Eur. J. Soc. Theory 401, 411. 
  11 
categories of people and things, that they are seeking to measure, 
along with the data that are gathered about these categories. So, 
Yamin and Fukuda Parr note in relation to the MDG’s that ‘once 
these numerical targets were set, they were perceived to be value 
neutral. In fact, however, there were assumptions deeply embedded 
in the MDG’s about the nature and purpose of development.’37  
Scholars of quantification who work within the STS vocabulary 
might describe this as a process of ‘black boxing’— once the 
foundational controversies over a particular measurement are 
settled, ‘the objects they produce can travel through networks 
without their foundational controversies being questioned or 
visible’.38  
Attending to the work of quantification also allows us to 
observe that the necessary institutional infrastructure is unequally 
distributed in our world, and perhaps enables or even enjoins us to 
attend more closely to what this unevenness might throw up. As 
we described in the first section, the ‘development project’ as it 
emerged in the postwar era was fundamentally a project of 
measurement and comparison. Given that it is impossible to track 
and compare what is not being counted, the lack of statistical 
capacity in many poor countries becomes transformed into a key 
development issue, and competes for funding with other worthy 
projects addressing access to education, water and sanitation, or 
adequate health care. The need for statistical capacity building in 
poor countries became a key plank in the poverty reduction 
strategy of the World Bank in the 1990s.39 It remains a current 
issue – the need for more and better data collection is reiterated in 
the MDG Final Report in 2015. The observation, frequently found 
in the literature, that indicators are created largely by experts in the 
global North, but rely on data collection processes in the global 
South has a variety of further implications.40 What happens next 
‘when wealthy nation-states and international organizations try to 
impose quantitative regimes globally, (and) some nations find it 
difficult to comply’ is both complex and unpredictable, as our case 
study of MDG 7D will illustrate.41    
                                                        
37 Fukuda-Parr and Yamin (n 9) 61. 
38 Porter (n 10) 538.  See also Bhuta (n 11); Davis et al., ‘The Local-Global Life 
of Indicators: Law, Power and Resistance’ in Merry et al. (eds) The Quiet Power 
of Indicators: Measuring Governance, Corruption and the Rule of Law (CUP 
2015) 5. 
39  For example, see Liam Clegg, 'Our Dream is a World Full of Poverty 
Indicators: The US, the World Bank, and the Power of Numbers' (2010) 15(4) 
New Political Economy 473 <http://doi.org/doi:10.1080/13563461003763170>.  
A renewed effort to collect poverty data from households was announced in 
2015 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/15/world-
bank-new-end-poverty-tool-surveys-in-poorest-countries>. 
40 Merry and Wood (n 11) 208. 
41 Espeland and Stevens (n 36) 411. 
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Further, Espeland and Stevens observe that the work of 
measuring the world is intimately entangled with wider social and 
political processes: ‘quantification usually is embedded in larger 
social projects.’ 42 The story we have offered in the preceding 
section of the co-emergence of the development project with a 
newly consolidating metric for measuring economic ‘progress’ in 
GNP is one illustration of this embedding, although we would 
resist an account which makes either the political project or the 
measurement project ontologically prior to the other.43 Taking an 
approach to the construction and circulation of development 
indicators that understands them as ‘the work that makes other 
kinds of work possible’ allows for analyses that trace the ways that 
particular indicators may function to advance, consolidate or 
confound larger political projects. As Amanda Perry-Kessaris 
observes of the World Bank’s longstanding promotion of foreign 
direct investment as a development tool, by equating effective 
governance with its impact on perceptions of the ‘climate for 
investment’: ‘Indicators are the weapons of choice for the knights 
of investment climate discourse.’ 44 Along similar lines, Tor 
Krever’s account of the ways in which the World Bank’s 
composite ‘rule of law’ indicator (under the auspices of its 
Worldwide Governance Indicators project) functions to reify a 
limited conception of lawfulness primarily identified with the 
protection of private property, contracts, and judicial independence 
reveal the extent to which this conception both fits within and 
serves to advance neoliberal global legal order.45  
‘Reactivity’ is Espeland and Steven’s second category; it is 
intended to direct attention to the ways in which measurement 
intervenes in the social worlds it purports to merely depict.  
Measures, in their account, are reactive in that they cause people to 
think and act differently. Sometimes these effects are intended, 
such as when governments seek to meet an MDG target for the 
education of girls by building more schools in poorer 
neighbourhoods, or even when a state might seek to improve its 
ranking in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ Index by reducing 
the time it takes to get a business license. Unintended 
consequences can and do arise in a variety of ways, either through 
actors seeking to ‘game’ the indicator, or through the re-allocation 
of resources to issues that are being tracked and away from equally 
                                                        
42 Ibid. 
43 The idiom of ‘co-production’ is pertinent here, as a method which ‘does not 
seek to foreclose competing explanations by laying claim to one dominant and 
all-powerful truth.  It offers instead a new way of exploring the waters of human 
history, where politics, knowledge and intervention are continually in flux.’ 
Jasanoff (n 1) 43. 
44 Perry-Kessaris, 'Prepare Your Indicators' (n 7) 402. 
45 Krever (n 7). 
  13 
significant but unquantified (or unquantifiable) issues. Espeland 
and Sauder explain that one common way for unintended 
consequences to arise is when changes in behaviour become 
‘decoupled from the processes the indicators are designed to reflect 
or measure’.46 Given the already observed tendency for the ‘work’ 
behind an indicator to fade into the background—it should not be 
surprising that development targets so often miss their mark.   
The literature on development indicators is rich with 
illustrations of the unintended and potentially undesirable effects 
of measurement. The Millennium Development Goals in particular 
have been subject to many strong critiques along these lines. The 
‘Power of Numbers’ project, directed by Yamin and Fukuda Parr, 
compiled case-studies on each of the Goals, all of which identified 
some form of unintended or undesirable effect.47 An often cited 
case in point is that of MDG#2, the objective of which was to 
achieve universal primary education, where a number of critics 
have observed that poor countries were encouraged to focus 
limited resources on ensuring higher enrolment rates at the primary 
level. 48  The spin-off, however, was that overall quality of 
education could suffer. Sufficient numbers of well-trained teachers 
were not necessarily available to take on the larger number of 
students, and where they were available, many faced dauntingly 
larger classrooms.  Students might have been recorded as enrolled, 
but as the goal and its associated indicators did not incorporate a 
consideration of whether they become literate, or in many cases, 
whether they in fact ever finished primary education, it was 
difficult to see the link between the objective of improving 
                                                        
46 Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder, 'The Dynamism of Indicators' 
in Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Classification and 
Rankings, Kevin Davis et al. (eds) (OUP 2012) 92. 
47 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., 'The Power of Numbers: A Critical Review of 
Millennium Development Goal Targets for Human Development and Human 
Rights' (2014) 15(2-3)  J. Hum. Dev. Capab 105 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1080/19452829.2013.864622>. ‘All (MDGs) led to 
unintended consequences in diverting attention from other important objectives 
and reshaping development thinking. Many of the indicators were poorly 
selected and contributed to distorting effects.’ 
48  See, Ashwani Saith, 'From Universal Values to Millennium Development 
Goals: Lost in Translation' (2006) 37(6) Dev Change 1167 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2006.00518.x>; Jeff Waage et al., 'The 
Millennium Development Goals: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis and Principles for 
Goal Setting after 2015' (2010) 376(9745) Lancet 991 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)61196-8>; Amir Attaran, 'An 
Immeasurable Crisis? A Criticism of the Millennium Development Goals and 
Why They Cannot Be Measured' (2005) 2(10) PLoS Medicine e318 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020318>. 
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education and the metric of primary enrolments. 49 As Saith 
succinctly sums up,  
 
…focusing exclusively on indicators of educational enrolments has 
inherent distortions: it pays no attention to the very high drop-out 
rates in primary and secondary education in the developing 
economies; it ignores issues of quality of outcomes; and it is blind 
to the resources committed per child in the educational process.50 
 
Ultimately, the targeting of primary education may have had the 
effect of drawing resources away from secondary and tertiary 
education sectors.51 This is an illustration of the ways in which 
successful indicators become powerful focal points for aligning 
expectations and influencing behaviour.52 Once they are produced 
and put into circulation, indicators can take on a ‘life of their own’, 
in which it is possible, even likely, that some or all of the uses to 
which they are put are ‘foreign to the intentions of the original 
producers.’53  
Espeland and Stevens’ third factor, which they call 
‘discipline’, concerns the way in which quantification facilitates a 
certain type of governance. That is, numbers can circulate easily 
and appear straightforward to interpret, making it possible to 
monitor or govern ‘at a distance’.54 This is made possible, largely, 
through the work of ‘commensuration’ – ‘a process fundamental to 
measurement that entails turning qualities into quantities that share 
the same metric.’ 55 Development indicators (such as GNP) 
simplify, exclude, and integrate information, making it possible to 
track and compare the ‘progress’ of a diverse array of economies 
and nations. Commensurability between developing nations should 
be understood, however, as an effect or end product of a two-step 
process in which first, vast amounts of information are made 
irrelevant, and second, a shared metric is imposed upon what 
remains.56 Commensuration is instrumental to the way in which the 
                                                        
49 Maya Fehling et al., 'Limitations of the Millennium Development Goals: A 
Literature Review' (2013) 8(10) Glob. Public Health 1115 
<http:doi.org/doi:10.1080/17441692.2013.845676>; Angeline M Barrett, 'A 
Millennium Learning Goal for education post-2015: a question of outcomes or 
processes’ (2011) 47(1) Comparative Education 119 
<http:doi.org/doi:10.1080/03050068.2011.541682>. 
50 Saith (n 48) 1173. 
51 Waage et al. (n 48) 999. 
52 Davis et al., 'Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators' (n 34). 
53 Davis et al., ‘The Local-Global Life of Indicators’ (n 38) 15. 
54 Peter Miller and Nikola Rose, ‘Governing Economic Life’ (2006) 19(1) Econ 
Soc 1; James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press 1999). 
55 Espeland and Sauder, 'The Dynamism of Indicators' (n 46) 91. 
56 Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael M Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity: 
How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds’ (2007) 113(1) Am. J. Sociol. 1. 
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selection and tracking of indicators come to operate as mechanisms 
of governance through its ability to transform ‘difference …into 
magnitude… — a matter of more or less rather than of kind.’57   
Development indicators ‘discipline’ governments and 
institutions by making complex social and political choices and 
judgments seem straightforward, by enhancing the role of experts 
and the organizations that collect data at the expense of local 
knowledge and decision-making, and displacing political judgment 
and responsibility away from governing bodies. 
 
Through the apparatus of science and measurement, the indicator 
displaces judgement from governing bodies onto the indicator 
itself, which establishes standards for judgement. Nevertheless, 
indicators are inevitably political, rooted in particular conceptions 
of problems and theories of responsibility. They represent the 
perspectives and frameworks of those who produce them, as well 
as their political and financial power. What gets counted depends 
on which groups and organisations can afford to count.58 
 
The necessary simplification of quantification also makes 
information seem more authoritative. 59 Not all quantitative 
measures have the same persuasive power, however; rather, the 
‘polyvalent authority’ or legitimacy of a given measure is 
something that groups or institutions behind an indicator must 
work to secure. As Espeland and Stevens note, the acquisition and 
mobilization of quantitative authority is a complex social and 
institutional process, which ‘gets built into institutions, circulates, 
and creates enduring structures that shape and constrain cognition 
and behavior.’60 One might point to the World Bank’s measure of 
absolute poverty as one such authoritative development indicator 
that has shaped both cognition and behaviour (although not 
uncontroversially).61 Authority is not fixed or absolute, however.  
Rather, processes of authorization are ongoing and contested, as 
Liam Clegg’s study of the complex struggles within and outside 
the Bank between income-based and multidimensional measures of 
poverty illustrates. 62 Attending to the struggles through which the 
legitimacy of the poverty indicator is produced and contested is as 
revealing for what is left out as much as for what is being 
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debated.63 In the case of poverty indicators, the available ‘multi-
dimensional’ measures of poverty are also highly reductive. In the 
realm of development, one of the most widely recognized 
multidimensional development indicators, the Human 
Development Index, has been widely criticized on this point.64  
One of the key authors of the Human Development Reports, 
Sakiko Fukuda Parr argues that the HDI only captures a small part 
of what would be considered important within a ‘human 
development’ framework, noting that ‘ironically, the success of the 
HDI has only served to reinforce the narrow interpretation of 
human development.’65 Another apparent paradox might be found 
here in an apparently inverse relation between the narrowness or 
reductivity of a particular metric, and its ability to be perceived and 
to circulate as legitimate and authoritative. Clarity and simplicity 
are essential if a new metric is to achieve a degree of recognition 
and credibility in the crowded and contested market of 
development indicators.   
 
Goals use the power of numbers to communicate a development 
agenda with a sense of scientific certitude and serious intent with 
the potential for accountability.  But, in reality, quantification 
reduces complex and intangible visions such as development that 
is inclusive into concrete and measurable objectives such as ‘all 
children in school’.66  
 
This brings us to Espeland and Stevens’s final category, which 
seeks to draw our attention to the ‘aesthetics’ of how we make 
pictures with numbers, observing that we tend to value clarity and 
parsimony above other qualities in our visual information. In their 
account, these qualities manifest the particular allure of numbers 
noted above: their peculiar capacity to appear to make complex 
phenomena comprehensible. This last category has, arguably, 
become even more relevant to the work of the sociologist of 
quantification in recent years. In our current social media 
                                                        
63 Robert Chambers, 'Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts?' (1995) 
7(1) Environment and Urbanization 173 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1177/095624789500700106>. 
64 Stanton (n 31); Ambuj D Sagar and Adil Najam, 'The Human Development 
Index: A Critical Review' (1998) 25(3) Ecol. Econ 249 
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65 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, 'Rescuing the Human Development Concept from the 
Human Development Index: Reflections on a New Agenda' in Sakiko Fukuda-
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environment, the circulation of seductively appealing 
visualizations (infovis) of quantified information is rapid, 
widespread, and frequently detached from relevant interpretive 
context. 67 Although development agencies have become 
increasingly sophisticated in their use of visual media to publicize 
various metrics in recent years, the role of aesthetics in the 
creation, circulation, legitimation, and influence of development 
indicators has, in our review of the literature, not yet been well 
studied.68    
The visualization of data, along with the background work 
of determining what and how to count, the adaptations of those 
being counted (in our case, developing states), the legitimacy 
acquired by particular indicators and the disciplining or 
governance effects of metrics in circulation - each play a 
significant role in determining ‘what gets done’. 
 
D.   Toward a sociology of the slum target:  Millennium 
Development Goal 7. D  
 
‘Numbers often help constitute the things they measure by directing 
attention, persuading, and creating new categories for apprehending the 
world’.69  
 
In this final section, and with the foregoing methodological 
roadmap in mind, we offer a brief account of the Millennium 
Development Goals process and the formulation, implementation, 
and dissemination of MDG 7.D in particular. Our account seeks to 
trace the widening ripples that result from the insertion of a new, 
quantified, target into the complex array of existing programs and 
policy relating to urban poverty, informal settlements, property, 
tenure, water, and sanitation already being advanced by global 
institutions including Cities Alliance, UN-Habitat and UNDP.  
This account is intended to be suggestive, rather than conclusive.  
That is, it is not our aim here to demonstrate the impacts of the 
                                                        
67 Heather Houser, 'The Aesthetics of Environmental Visualizations: More than 
Information Ecstasy?' (2014) 26(2) Publ.  Cult 319 
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1215/08992363-2392084>. 
68 But see Perry-Kessaris, ‘The Case for a Visualized Economic Sociology’ (n 
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and their representation or attending to the constitutive role of a particular 
‘aesthetic’ in the construction of a particular indicator. 
69 Espeland and Stevens (n 36) 404.   
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slum target, but rather, to illustrate how, through (re)framing our 
orientation to the study of the target, that the question of its effects 
presents itself as legitimate terrain for future research.   
The disconnect between the aspirations expressed in the 
Millennium Declaration – that it would inaugurate an era of 
people-centered development policies, guided by a human 
development framework and respectful of human rights – and the 
Millennium Development Goals process that followed has been 
widely commented on.70 Yet our analysis suggests that it is how 
we characterize the social processes which unfolded in that space 
that matters: was it merely a process of translation, of information 
gathering for the purpose of policy making and increased 
accountability, or a globalized imposition of categories with 
consequences on poor countries?  
While a detailed, sociologically oriented history of the 
process by which a group of objectives became identified in the 
Declaration and were eventually ‘translated’ into 8 goals, 21 
targets and 60 indicators is well beyond the scope of this chapter, it 
is important to make note of a few key milestones in the MDG 
process as a whole in order to make sense of our account of the 
evolution and application of MDG 7.D.71 The targets that became 
the MDGs find their roots in geopolitics and development 
discourses that preceded them. The end of the Cold War reduced 
the East-West paralysis between Western and USSR-aligned blocs 
at the United Nations.72 While the human development approach 
took hold through the 1990s, and within that the Human 
Development Index (HDI), several international summits and 
conferences proved foundational to the later articulated MDGs.  
The earliest was that of the International World Summit for 
Children in 1990, followed by the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) in September 1994, and both 
the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and the 
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 1995. The Social 
Summit in particular was ‘crucial for the MDGs as global 
                                                        
70 David Hulme and Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, 'International Norm Dynamics and 'the 
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(2009) 96 Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper 
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consensus was reached that poverty eradication was the priority for 
development,’ (as originally emphasised).73 
Around this time, the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee established a Groupe de Réflexion to examine all the 
declarations and concluding resolutions from the UN summits in 
the early 1990s. In May 1996, the Groupe published their first 
paper in which they set out six quantitative ‘International 
Development Goals’ (IDGs).  Like the later MDGs, the IDGs were 
concerned with issues of poverty, education, and health and set a 
deadline of 2015 for achievement. Although the goals were 
initially given limited attention, they slowly gained more traction 
as the Millennium Summit drew near.74 
In March 2000, the UN released a report entitled We the 
Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, which 
re-visioned the UN’s role in development. Among other things, the 
report declared ‘a more people-oriented United Nations must be a 
more results-based organization,’ (as originally emphasised).75  
As would be seen, the We the Peoples report captured many of the 
themes that would later form the Millennium Declaration.  Like the 
OECD-DAC’s IDGs, it drew together resolutions from the UN 
conferences of the 1990s, but on a broader range of topics.76 
In September 2000, 189 countries signed the Millennium 
Declaration. To avoid having the unprecedented international 
commitment slip into obscurity, the UN quickly set about creating 
tangible goals around which to anchor the promises made in the 
Declaration. A group was soon established to translate the 
Declaration into a list of targets and indicators. Interestingly, this 
was the same group77 that had worked together to create the list of 
IDGs released jointly by the UN, OECD, World Bank, and IMF 
report in October 2000, one month following the signing of the 
Declaration.78  
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After the passage of the Millennium Declaration, there was 
a perceived need to avoid duplication of global efforts, and the 
IDGs presented an attractive and convincing model around which 
to mobilize support. Efforts were then taken to transform the IDGs 
from donor goals to global goals.79 It was no easy feat, as Karver, 
Kenny and Sumner noted, since the MDG creators had to walk a 
‘tightrope’ between the ambitious targets that had been agreed to in 
prior UN summits and conferences, and targets that were 
politically palatable and therefore fell within the realm of 
possibility.80 
The eight MDGs were officially revealed on 6 September 
2001 through the Road map towards the implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary 
General.81 Of the seven key objectives listed in the Millennium 
Declaration, only one became fundamental to the MDG framework 
– that of development and poverty eradication.82 Others, such as 
those relating to peace, security, disarmament, human rights and 
democracy, were left behind. Hayman argued that such limits  
made it easier for donors to justify policies that focused solely on 
MDG targets.83  
The resulting MDG goals were originally set out as global 
goals, however there was soon pressure for those same goals to be 
taken on as country targets. The problem with this was that global 
goals were set outside of any consideration of particular countries 
historical experiences and thus each goal was not necessarily 
attainable at the country level by every country.84   
To the extent that the list of goals was based largely on 
goals previously created by the OECD, World Bank, and IMF 
together with the UN, and were operationalized by a small group 
of development ‘experts’ located in the north, the MDG process 
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can be understood as an extension and elaboration of the 
‘development project’ described at the outset of this chapter. This 
dynamic led some to argue that the MDG concentration on 
developing country issues serves to ‘ghettoize the problem of 
development and [locate] it firmly in the third world.’85 And yet, 
once the contested process of framing, selecting, and defining was 
completed, the MDG targets were presented to the world not as 
political, but as technical problems, 86  illuminating as discussed 
above one of the ways in which quantification operates to obscure 
its social embeddedness. At the global level, the MDGs operated as 
a powerful vehicle for the production of knowledge about poorer 
nations, re-‘making’ the world in ways that Truman would have 
found familiar, with ongoing, albeit unacknowledged, 
consequences. The development project is at this point so 
thoroughly embedded within the common sense of international 
institutions that it can be difficult to envision alternatives at the 
macro-level. The implications of particular practices of 
measurement can more readily be grasped in the moment of 
intervention or imposition of particular new measurements or 
targets, such as in the case of MDG Target 7D. 
MDG 7D was drawn from the inaugural report of an 
umbrella organization called Cities Alliance, a partnership between 
the World Bank, UN-Habitat, and a small handful of governments 
and nongovernmental organizations, formed in the late 1990s.  
Cities Alliance launched the ‘Cities without Slums Action Plan ’at 
its inaugural 1999 meeting. 87 The Plan found new form as 
Millennium Development Goal 7, target 11, later revised as 
Millennium Development Goal 7D. The Millennium Declaration 
of September 2000 explicitly recognized this link: ‘By 2020, to 
have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers as proposed in the ‘Cities Without Slums’ 
initiative.’ 88 It is important to note that at the time of the 
Millennium Declaration, no universally accepted definition for the 
term ‘slum’ existed. Indeed, in the decades prior, countries had 
rarely included data on slums in their development reports. 89   
Given that the objective of the Millennium Declaration was to 
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‘mainstream a set of inter-connected and mutually reinforcing 
development goals into a global agenda,’ it followed that the 
inclusion of a ‘slum’ target in the universalized MDG project 
would require a universal definition for this complex 
phenomenon.90 In identifying ‘slums’ as a problem for cities that 
aspired to be modern, the Cities Alliance initiative and the ensuing 
MDG process called for the creation of a new area of knowledge 
and expertise. Unsurprisingly, the work of defining, tracking and 
targeting this new global entity of the ‘slum’ fell to a small group 
of already identified global development ‘experts’.    
In October 2002, thirty-five international experts joined 
Cities Alliance and UN Habitat staff in Nairobi to formulate ‘an 
operational definition of security of tenure and slums’91 over two 
days. They produced a series of ‘sub-indicators’ to measure both 
security of tenure and slums, as well as ‘composite indices and 
meta-indicators.’92 While it was recognized that the definitions and 
indicators agreed upon would continue to be modified, this small 
group of people ostensibly succeeded in casting a universal 
definition of what it meant to live in a slum. A slum household was 
defined as ‘a group of individuals living under the same roof that 
lack one or more of: access to improved water; access to improved 
sanitation; durability of housing; security of tenure; [and/or] 
sufficient living area’.93 
As we’ve discussed in the previous section, the background 
‘work’ of constructing an indicator involves often difficult and 
contentious selections of emphasis – some elements are 
highlighted at the expense of others. However, there is often a 
certain inevitability, or path dependency, associated with the 
process of narrowing that accompanies the identification of data 
points that can be tracked. Statistics that are already being gathered 
tend to be selected; elements for which no current data exists will 
be dropped. Not surprisingly, the most difficult element of the 
slum definition the experts in Nairobi discussed measuring was 
security of tenure. The group defined security of tenure as ‘the 
right of all individuals and groups to effective protection from the 
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state against unlawful evictions.’ 94 This definition reflects the 
concern that security of tenure be defined in a way that addressed 
the problems associated with its absence. While ultimately security 
of tenure remained included in the universal definition of slum 
noted above, unlike all other elements of the definition, indicators 
for the concept were left to be ‘defined later’.  
The ‘slum’ definition and indicators that came out of the 
Nairobi meeting in 2003 continued to evolve, as elements of slums 
that could be most amenable to measurement were foregrounded 
and more problematic elements were cast away. Security of tenure 
would ultimately prove too difficult to measure and be removed 
from the slum definition, notwithstanding clear evidence that it 
was central to urban development and protection from forced 
evictions and other human rights violations. A 2006 UNEP report 
on MDG progress called it a particularly difficult indicator to 
measure, but at the same time ‘one of the most essential elements 
of a successful shelter strategy.’95  
While the original MDG targets and framework were 
reportedly settled in 2003,96 the importance of security of tenure 
became less recognized over time as the measurability of the 
indicator remained in question, and targets and indicators for the 
other ‘elements’ of the slum definition were solidified, tracked 
and recorded. The 2005 World Summit led the UN Secretary 
General to recommend the addition of four new MDG targets (A, 
B, C and D). In 2007, the UN General Assembly agreed to 
include these four additional targets and re-organize the MDG, 
reframing the slum target from Goal 7, Target 11 to MDG Target 
7D. This new official framework ‘supersede[d] the previous 
version,’97 effectively excluding security of tenure from the MDG 
slum definition and MDG discourse, with little explanation or 
notice. The UN Statistics division concisely notes the outcome of 
this culling process in a footnote: ‘...since information on secure 
tenure is not available for most of the countries, only the first four 
indicators are used to define slum household, and then to estimate 
the proportion of urban population living in slums’.98 
Security of tenure did not disappear altogether in 
development discourse and programming, but its prominence, 
                                                        
94 Ibid. 8. 
95  Millennium Development Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability 
(Report compiled by UNEP and UN-HABITAT 2006) 14. 
96  Millennium Development Goals 
<https://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=32>. 
97  The World Bank Group, Millennium Development Goals 
<http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01058/WEB/GDMIS122.HTM?siteI
d=2&menuId=LNAV01>.  
98  Millennium Development Goals Indicators, Series Metadata 
<https://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx>. 
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legitimacy, and funding were dramatically impacted. Tenure 
security was relegated to a separate ‘track’ through the UN 
Habitat’s Global Campaign for Secure Tenure. Even as MDG 
programming continued apace and MDG progress reports 
repeatedly cast security of tenure as too difficult to measure, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing convened its [his] 
own expert working groups on indicators for the right to housing, 
including secure tenure. This schism presents one intriguing 
avenue for future research. Interviews with participants in the 
discussions that took place within UN and intergovernmental 
institutions and at past expert meetings where the slum target was 
formulated and operationalized might reveal tensions between 
rights talk and efficiency-oriented approaches to growth jostling 
for prominence.99  Reconstructing the debates among experts could 
reveal the political stakes of different methods and modes of 
quantification that remain opaque in the ensuing data. What can be 
noted without access to these insights, however, is that the element 
of tenure security calls for recognition of the right to land use and 
occupation by the poor, situating their rights vis-à-vis others – a 
relative, rather than an absolute, approach to poverty and poverty 
alleviation that problematizes and politicizes land inequality in 
cities in a way that improved water and sanitation campaigns do 
not.   
In what was perhaps an effort to avoid politics, the excision 
of security of tenure from the MDG slum target was a political 
choice itself. Seemingly based on exigencies of measurement and 
the political volatility of the tenure indicator, rather than other 
factors that might arguably be more closely linked to the goal of 
bringing about ‘improvements’ in living conditions of the urban 
poor, it was a decision that had significant effects not only on the 
production of knowledge about slums and slum residents, but also 
on the ways in which governments acted to achieve the targets.100 
We don’t want to be read as suggesting that a better decision 
would have been to include - and therefore, find a way to quantify 
- the right to tenure security. Rather, our claim is a more basic one 
about the entangled relationship between defining and measuring. 
Our argument is that in relation to the MDG Target 7.D, as with 
the various other development indicators we’ve discussed in this 
chapter, it is in the process of ‘making the myriad decisions 
                                                        
99  The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements (UN-
HABITAT 2003). 
100 Marie Huchzermeyer provides an excellent critical account of the effects of 
MDG 7D in several African nations. In particular, she traces the ways in which 
governments in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Nigeria made reference to the 
target in justifying the necessity of various slum eradication projects. Marie 
Huchzermeyer, Cities with ‘Slums’ from Informal Settlement Eradication to a 
Right to the City in Africa (UCT Press, 2011). 
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necessary to operationalize a (legal) definition,’ such as UN 
Habitat’s definition of a ‘slum’, that the phenomenon itself is 
produced.101   
 
E.  Conclusion 
 
Perhaps targeting a problem is not always as useful as situating a 
problem. Perhaps it encourages us to focus on symptoms rather 
than causes; perhaps it leaves unaddressed, and hence intact, the 
many direct and indirect sources of the problem that we seek to 
solve or alleviate.102 
 
Though the debates over methodology and measurement in relation 
to development outcomes are both convoluted and contentious, the 
technocratic nature of the development project as it emerged in the 
postwar moment remains a constant. Insofar as the project of 
international ‘development’ was conceived fundamentally as a 
project of (economic) measurement, comparison and 
quantification, the indicators and statistics in use at a given time 
provide determinate content to the aspirational project of 
development. Development indicators frame both objects and 
outcomes through a transformative lens which conflates means and 
ends; equating the collection of ever more quantifiable and 
globally commensurable data points with the project of realizing 
stated ambitions of global development institutions, as exemplified 
by the World Bank’s own slogan ‘Our Dream is a World Free of 
Poverty’.     
From the postwar prominence of GNP to the Millennium 
Development Goals, the perspective taken by the ‘development 
project’ has been a high level ‘view from above’ which presumes 
that we can ‘see’ a national economy as a totality and measure its 
successes and failures in aggregative terms and moreover, that 
                                                        
101  A similar argument is made by Kerry Rittich in the context of trafficking and 
forced labour in ‘Representing, Counting, Valuing: Managing Definitional 
Uncertainty in the Law of Trafficking” (2017) P. Kotiswaran, ed Revisiting the 
Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery 
(Cambridge U Press). ‘In addition, the exercises in defining, measuring and 
valuing reveal trafficking and forced labour to be not simply problems that we 
struggle to regulate and repress through legal rules and regimes. Instead, they 
appear to possess a prior, more intimate relationship to law. We might say, then, 
that it is in the process of making the myriad decisions necessary to 
operationalize the legal definitions of trafficking and forced labour by which - in 
theory - we merely seek to capture and control them that the phenomenon of 
trafficking is itself produced.’.at p. 270.  
102  Kerry Rittich, ‘Governing by Measuring: The Millennium Development 
Goals in Global Governance,’ in Ruth Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), 
Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (Hart 
Publishing, 2014) 184. 
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those statistics can be usefully compared with those of other 
‘national economies’. In this chapter, we have explored the process 
by which the ‘power of numbers’ operates within development 
discourse.  In particular, we have sought to reveal something of the 
process, or ‘work’, through which these difficult and contestable 
choices about what issues to give priority to and which data to 
track, become ‘black-boxed’ in the ensuing indicator, such that the 
resulting ‘data’ appear straightforward and ‘factual’. We have also 
explored the ways in which some topics come to seem both 
evidently priorities and inherently ‘measurable’ (income poverty) 
while other issues remain stubbornly beyond the reach of both 
statistical indices and public attention. Drawing on the robust body 
of recent scholarship on development indicators, we have 
illustrated the ways in which these metrics tend to remake the 
world they are purporting only to reflect; the governance 
implications of the production of quantitative data that is globally 
commensurate; and the ways in which indicators make claims to 
authority. We have also noted the related and growing significance 
of the production and circulation of visualizations of quantitative 
information such as development indicators. 
We have suggested ways that the complex social process 
that unfolded between the articulation of lofty global aspirations in 
the Millennium Declaration and the searchable set of data points, 
data visualizations and reports that emerged from the MDGs in 
2015 might be studied and understood as a constitutive process, a 
type of world-making with profound consequences for poorer 
countries. Our short history of MDG 7.D in the final section of the 
chapter sought to illuminate some of the particularities of its 
production and operationalization, the configuration of the 
relations between the ‘technical’ and the ‘political’ in the 
definition and measurement of slums, and to suggest how that 
process contributes to re-defining the appropriate nature and scope 
of development policy in urban contexts. We argue that the 
operationalization of the MDG 7.D target effectively reduced a 
complex and diverse field of urban development planning and 
policy to a narrow (and politically contentious) definition of the 
‘slum’ buttressed by a very limited number of quantifiable 
indicators. In the context of the global profile of the MDGs, the 
aggregate of these quantifiable indicators came to determine which 
neighbourhoods counted as ‘slums’, notwithstanding the 
heterogeneity of built environments and populations residing in 
urban settlements around the world. Moreover, the coalesced 
support of international institutions for the MDGs lent a 
considerable amount of momentum to the City without Slums 
target and its partial and reductive set of indicators, potentially 
overriding more complex analyses and policy recommendations 
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regarding the diverse circumstances of the marginally housed 
urban poor. The way in which this target was operationalized, and 
in particular the decision not to track security of tenure, an element 
that could have revealed pertinent differences in the ways in which 
different jurisdictions sought to improve their statistics on the 
indicator, is a poignant illustration of the necessary corollary to the 
MDG slogan ‘what gets measured gets done.’ In the realm of 
quantified knowledge production for development, it might equally 
be claimed: ‘what doesn’t get measured, doesn’t count’.    
 
 
